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Abstract
Turkish policy towards the Syrian civil war, as operationalized in relation
to the implementation of no-fly zones, safe zones or buffer zones, has
been the subject of much debate among scholars. As the number of
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss4/1
foreign states acting in Syria has steadily increased since the onset of
the crisis, Turkish policies have similarly shifted. In order to make sense
of Turkey’s actions and reactions in the first five years of the Syrian civil
war, this article attempts to draw lessons from quantitative methods and
methodologies such as text mining, cosine similarity and cosine
normalization of content from the Anadolu Agency (AA), a Turkish state-
owned press. These methodologies are utilized in support of content
analysis and qualitative analysis that hindsight allows. In doing so, we
are able to show that these seemingly inexplicable shifts may adhere to a
logic and, in some cases, could have been anticipated. Utilizing such
methodologies therefore offers a potentially significant contribution to
the literature by defining politically feasible outcomes related to foreign
or domestic policies.
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Introduction: Setting the Stage 
 
Syria’s civil war has produced a myriad of national security challenges for 
Turkey.1 Ankara’s response has oscillated between trying to insulate itself 
from the effects of conflict to policies seeking to shape the situation in its 
southern neighbor. During the period of this research, from 2012 to 2016, 
Turkey’s policies and actions towards Syria appeared contradictory. Many 
observers had a hard time explicating what was at play.2 This was certainly 
the case with Turkish initiatives to establish either buffer zones, safe 
zones, or no-fly zones–or all three at the same time–in Syria. This research 
is an attempt to shed light on the best accounts for Ankara’s changeable 
policy toward various foreign policy options, such as buffer zones and no-
fly zones by using methodologies such as text mining and related cosine 
similarity measures of reporting by the Anadolu Agency (AA), a Turkish 
state-owned press. In doing so, we are able to show a basic structure of the 
international relations of Turkey in relation to Syria through the 
quantitative analysis of related texts. Applying these methodologies in 
concert with content analysis and qualitative analysis can potentially shed 
further light on what appear, at first glance, to be Turkey’s seemingly 
inexplicable policy shifts. 
 
As the Arab Spring gained strength in 2011, protests engulfed Syria and 
threatened the Ba’athist regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Assad and 
loyalist forces turned to bombardment and violence in order to cling to 
power, losing legitimacy with many inside and outside the country. At this 
early stage, Turkey’s role was arguably constructive and focused. Over a 
decade of engagement with and investment in Syria, Turkey tried to use its 
influence by brokering a resolution leaving Assad in power. However, 
Turkey faced sustained pressure from Washington and other NATO allies 
to sever ties with Damascus after US President Barrack Obama declared 
Assad illegitimate. This pressure was comprised of diplomatic efforts and 
negative reporting in the international press arguing that collusion with 
Assad made Turkey complicit in Syria’s bloodbath. Additionally, as 
Turkish public opinion turned against Assad and domestic pressure 
increased, Ankara desisted in its attempted role as peace broker.  
 
When Turkey cut ties with Assad in September 2011, it immediately 
became one of the most vocal critics of the Ba’athist regime, demanding 
Assad’s unconditional exit prior to any resolution in the Syrian crisis. It 
was also at this time, in September 2011, that Ankara first discussed the 
establishment of a buffer zone, and formally endorsed this course of 
action, contingent on international support and approval, in November of 
that year.3 By March 2012, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
examining the options of both a “safe zone” and “buffer zone.”4 From that 
point onward, Turkish policy shifted between safe zones, buffer zones and 
no-fly zones.5 From one perspective, it is unsurprising that Turkey would 
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explore these different policies. There are various options for states 
attempting to demilitarize an area, and multiple reasons for wanting to do 
so. These concepts – safe zone, buffer zone, and no-fly zone–have 
particular meanings in international law and politics and state officials 
enact them with specific policy purposes in mind, as described in greater 
detail below.  
 
Safe zones are spaces where civilians or the injured are protected from 
belligerents.6 Despite past failures in their establishment in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, the creation of territorial sanctuaries free of military activity has 
an enduring appeal for decision-makers. 7  Indeed, in early 2017, US 
President Donald Trump said he would “absolutely do safe zones in 
Syria.”8 Sometimes referred to as safe havens, safety zones, humanitarian 
corridors, or protected areas, safe zones are, in essence, humanitarian 
buffer zones designed to shield civilians from violence.9 As shown below, 
this is commensurate with how the Turkish media reporting typically 
interprets the terms. Enacting safe zones is usually a multilateral effort 
done to protect population clusters, such as whole towns (as in Bosnia) or 
over wider areas (Kurdish Iraq in 1991). The underlying stated principle 
behind safe zones is that civilians are outside the realm of conflict and 
worthy of protection.  
 
A buffer zone is about the spatial delimitation of a strip of territory, either 
adjacent to a border or in between two warring parties within a state. The 
US military defines a buffer zone as “a defined area controlled by a peace 
operations force [. . .] formed to create an area of separation between 
disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.” 
This definition accurately describes multilaterally supervised zoned-off 
areas, such as in Cyprus. Unilateral establishment aims at creating a 
cordon sanitaire, insulating a bordering state, for example, from the 
effects of the neighboring conflict. It can also provide an offensive 
instrument to stage cross-border operations. However, the legal 
imprecision of a buffer zone means that it offers strategic flexibility for the 
side establishing it. A buffer zone’s dual offence-defense characteristic may 
be attractive to decision-makers wishing to keep options open.  
 
A no-fly zone is implemented either to protect civilians from aerial attack 
or to ensure that allied rebel groups remain viable against an adversary 
government.10 No-fly zones are standalone military tools (such as the no-
fly zone over Libya in 2011) or used in tandem with safe havens and buffer 
zones (Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991 is an example 
of all three happening at once). Additionally, no-fly zones can be thought 
of more as a means of implementing a buffer zone or safe zone alongside 
ground and naval forces. 
 
Given the distinction between each of these concepts–distinctions largely 
shared by the Turkish government– explaining what best accounts for 
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Ankara’s changeable policy towards each option is the goal of this 
research. Over the course of 2012-2016, Turkey has mercurially swung 
back and forth between each of the demilitarizing options listed above. 
Careful qualitative analysis of the period 2012-2016, supported by text 
mining of Turkish state-owned press (articles from the Anadolu Agency 
(AA) newspapers), reveals that seemingly inexplicable policy shifts are a 
reflection of what policy steps had become politically feasible in Turkey 
vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. However, before moving onto the analysis 
sections, the article explains the methodology employed.  
 
Methodology 
 
The research employs cosine similarity figures and normalization as a 
measure to evaluate the closeness of words. Cosine similarity is relatively 
simple and lends itself to an intuitive understanding of an issue or 
question. That is, it is defined by the inner product of two vectors divided 
by the product of their norms. Thus, cosine similarity represents the angle 
of two vectors so that it can become one when those vectors have the same 
direction. In the context of text mining, the vector represents each word in 
the whole text, namely Corpus; therefore, cosine similarity can be used as 
a measure of word similarity. As one recent study explains, “A network 
consists of units and relations, or nodes and edges. The units are 
references and their relations are similarities. In order to observe the 
latent similarity structures in the data, the number of co-occurrences must 
be normalized.”11 Ahlgren, Jarneving, and Rousseau (2003) proposed the 
cosine as similarity criterion.12 According to Leydesdorff, cosine 
normalization is preferable has been the subject of increasing consensus 
among scientometricians over the past two decades.13 
 
Applying text mining should be considered as a useful methodology in the 
field of policy analysis, especially in the case of rapidly changing 
situations. Text mining results should be dealt with carefully even though 
they can be enlightening when coupled with a time-series analysis and 
given a supporting role. For example, as shown in Table 1, the number of 
articles for a particular keyword in a particular year is a tiny fraction of 
articles issued in a year. Similarly, the number of particular keywords (e.g. 
"Safe Zone") may not be large enough for robust calculation of cosine 
similarity. Numerically assessing the “risk” of applying text mining with 
the small number of words targeted is impossible because a method for 
doing so does not exist. The possibility of such a "risk" factor should be 
kept in mind when examining the cosine similarity in Table 2. Small 
differences in cosine similarity among keywords may not properly 
represent the relationship between keywords, if word count of a particular 
keyword is small. In the same context, time-series analysis about a 
particular keyword should also be conducted with due attention to its 
word count shown in Table 2. Still, when researchers are fully aware of 
possible pitfalls in applying text mining which is recognized as a 
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methodology for analyzing related texts quantitatively, it should be a 
powerful tool to show a new dimension of the issues being studies. It 
should also be kept in mind, when Table 1 and 2 are examined, that 
 
1. a particular keyword usually appears only once or twice in an 
article, and  
2. it does not appear only in a particular context (e.g. official 
policy proclamation). 
 
We adopt Word2vec as an algorithm of vector representation of words. 
Briefly speaking, Word2vec can be assumed as the optimization of the 
conditional appearance probabilities of neighboring words. As a result, 
researchers can acquire a high dimensional vector space that represents 
the given corpus, which enables us to calculate the cosine similarity.  
Tomas Mikolov and his colleagues developed Word2vec at Google in 2013 
and it largely relies on the theory of neural networks.14 
 
Many previous studies have used cosine similarity in text mining analysis. 
For example, Al-Anzi and AbuZeina examined text classification of Arabic 
literature using cosine similarity.15 As the corpus, they used articles of 
Alqabas newspaper in Kuwait. More recently, Kristiansen has analyzed the 
latent structures of communication in the field of international relations 
(IR).16 By using citation data from more than 20,000 articles published in 
59 IR journals and employing cosine similarity and text mining, 
Kristensen was able to conclude that IR communication remains centered 
around American, general and theoretical IR journals and that to practice 
this method of communication forms a critical dimension of being an IR 
scholar. 
 
We have attempted to employ cosine similarity in a similar manner to that 
of some of the existing literature. In doing so, we are able to show a basic 
structure of the international relations between Turkey and Syria through 
the quantitative analysis of related texts. For our corpus, we use articles 
exclusively from AA’s English language publications. We verified that most 
articles published on AA’s English-language website were translated from 
the original Turkish independently.17 This key fact had a large impact on 
our choice of text mining terms given subtle differences or lack thereof 
between Turkish and English terms. For example, how do we know that 
the English terms for safe zone, buffer zone, and no-fly zone mean the 
same thing in Turkish, and, more to the point are translated consistently? 
The Turkish phrase tampon bölge has a clear translation as buffer zone. 
No-fly zone is usually translated as either uçuşa izin verilmeyen bölge or 
uçuşa yasak bölge. Both share the meaning that flight is prohibited and 
would be translated as no-fly zone in the English version of AA. When 
referring to safe havens in general, Turkish speakers may use the terms 
güvenli liman or sığınacak liman. There is, however, a term for safe haven 
that has more specific military connotations güvenli bölge. When referring 
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to safe zones, the term güvenli bölge is also used. We can assume, 
therefore, that in the case of establishing a militarily protected safe zone or 
safe haven, güvenli bölge would be used in Turkish. Additionally, the fact 
that the term güvenli bölge can refer to either safe haven or safe zone as 
well as the overwhelming prevalence of the term in Turkish-language 
reporting, regardless of media source, and general confusion over the 
differences between terms had direct implications in our calculations of 
cosine similarity. That is, while our text mining analysis used the terms 
safe zone and safe haven, we combined the two in calculating cosine 
similarity. As noted, we did this because AA reports are often based on 
press releases by or the statements of Turkish government officials. As 
such, AA writers and reporters, writing in Turkish and most often using 
the term güvenli bölge, likely translated that term as either safe zone or 
safe haven in English-language reporting. 
 
We chose articles from AA for another reason: The media outlet is 
operated as an arm of the Turkish state.18 Established in 1920, AA has a 
mandate to provide news of Turkey and the Turkish government to the 
rest of the world. State-dominated media can provide a useful means 
through which to monitor, and perhaps scrutinize, the evolving policy and 
actions of a government. Governments that dominate the main media 
organs in a country do so to control editorial content. The power of 
editorial omission is often used to limit any discussion of alternative 
policies. As a corollary, media content in such countries conveys pro-
government narratives about unfolding policy decisions. Outside observers 
have long paid close attention to the content of foreign state-run media 
organs in order to make inferential judgements about what that 
government is thinking. The level of confidence observers attach to these 
inferences depends on the character of the state media, which varies 
considerably from state to state. In tightly controlled state media, often as 
much can be deduced from what is not said as from that which is. It comes 
as little surprise that during the Cold War, Western watchers of the Soviet 
Union assiduously read Pravda, the mouthpiece of Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU).19 
 
When it comes to state control over the media, Turkey is not Soviet Russia. 
However, while Turkey has arguably enjoyed a relatively open public space 
since the late 1980s, press freedoms have been curtailed in recent years.20 
The result has become a quasi-commercial media environment in Turkey 
in which the ruling AK Party has an increasingly influential editorial hand, 
especially over the two state-owned media outlets: The Radio-TV giant 
TRT and the AA news agency. Especially through the appointment of new 
board members, AA in now more closely connected to the AK Party.21  
Because of its increasing politicization and its focus on growing its 
international audience akin to China’s CCTV and Russia’s RT, we assess 
AA is a sound repository for mapping and gauging the evolution of Turkish 
government foreign policy preferences and actions. By utilizing the 
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methodology detailed above, the remaining sections analyze Turkish 
policy towards the Syrian civil war.  
 
2011-2012: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Syria Crisis 
 
After Turkey severed relations with Assad and committed itself to regime 
change, it strengthened ties with select opposition groups in Syria in 
concert with a range of regional and international actors.22 These included 
the US, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which backed various, 
often-competing non-state armed actors.23 With little common ground 
between groups and their outside supporters besides opposition to Assad, 
Syria became a stage set for the enactment of a number of small civil wars 
pitting groups against each other with clashing policy agendas set 
variously in Ankara, Riyadh, and Washington.24 While the rhetoric 
emanating from these capitals and opposition summits was unequivocal 
regarding Assad’s departure, there were no correspondingly cooperative 
efforts on the ground. 
 
Iran became an increasingly important player, and Iranian soldiers and 
Shi’a militias deployed from Iraq supplied critical manpower in support of 
Assad. Iran also helped ensure the Assad regime’s survival by mobilizing 
its ally Hezbollah and supplying critical weapons and services.25 Russia 
was also keen to see the Assad remain to keep its base at Tartus, the only 
Russian presence in the Mediterranean. However, Moscow largely played 
a waiting game throughout 2012. Yet the unwavering vocal support of 
Russia and material support of Iran for Assad would prove critical to the 
regime’s survival and was the polar opposite of disjointed efforts, often at 
cross-purposes, of the umbrella of opposition.26 
 
As Turkey tried to develop coherent and proactive, rather than reactive 
foreign policies, it began to feel the effects of fighting across its 822km 
border in two distinct ways. First, it became a direct target of Assad regime 
attacks.27 Second, refugees began to flee to Turkey as the humanitarian 
disaster unfolded in Syria. However, it attempted to provide succor by 
combining the resources of the Turkish Red Crescent with those of Turkish 
and foreign NGOs, Turkey possessed neither the money nor the scale of 
services necessary to host what was still a trickle of refugees.28 
 
During the course of 2011-2012, most of Syria’s territory contiguous to the 
Turkish border remained under regime control. This partially impeded the 
movement of refugees into Turkey, but it also meant that forces loyal to 
Assad were able to act with a large degree of impunity on both sides of the 
border. Ankara viewed the establishment of a buffer zone positively as a 
method to help contain the refugee influx without drawing in other 
states.29 Ankara proposed the creation of a buffer zone in September 2011 
intending to create a safe haven for both rebel forces fighting against the 
Syrian government and refugees fleeing the fighting.30 It did so to also 
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ensure Syria’s territorial integrity. Ankara repeated calls for international 
humanitarian support. “We expect the UN to step in,” said then foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. “When refugee numbers reach thousands, this 
problem goes beyond being an internal issue and becomes an international 
one. No one has the right to expect Turkey to take on this international 
responsibility on its own.”31 
 
Ankara assessed Assad would fall within six months to a year and 
therefore stopped short of calling for the creation of a no-fly zone such as 
that seen earlier in Libya. Instead, Turkey publicly opposed external 
intervention and signaled it would act unilaterally in the creation of a 
buffer zone or safe zone. However, Ankara never adequately defined the 
concept of a “buffer zone,” instead referring to it as both a safe zone and a 
buffer zone with the aim of ensuring Syria’s territorial integrity.32 
 
By 2012, text mining figures compiled from AA demonstrate that semantic 
confusion had become even more pronounced, and the policy confusion 
that resulted therefrom led Ankara to push for the establishment of buffer 
zones that also would have included elements of a safe zone policed by a 
no-fly zone (Table 1). In effect, Ankara was pushing for a larger, but 
limited intervention in Syria aimed at protecting its borders, shoring up 
internal opposition to the Assad regime, and stemming the flow of 
refugees.33 This is further demonstrated by and consistent with our cosine 
similarity calculations in 2012, where AA articles on buffer zones and no-
fly zones demonstrated the greatest degree of cosine similarity [0.73] 
followed by buffer zone and safe zone [0.67] and no-fly zone and safe zone 
[0.59] (Table 2). This indicates not only possible confusion over which 
direction to take, but also over differences in terminology that a layman or 
even government official would not notice but military personnel would. 
This also demonstrates a basic convergence of interest in establishing 
buffer zones coupled with calls for a no-fly zone to be policed by Turkey in 
concert with other international actors, namely the US.34 
 
At this point in time, there were indications that at least some Turkish 
officials assessed the US, perhaps in concert with other NATO allies, would 
intervene militarily in Syria after the November 2012 US presidential 
elections.35 Turkey also continued to play a visible if less-than-robust role 
in multi-party international negotiations.36 Additionally, Turkey began to 
respond more forcefully to the Syrian army’s border incursions and 
shelling.37 Yet as 2012 ended with shells continuing to fall on Turkish cities 
and Assad’s army continuing to strafe and bomb civilians, ever more 
domestic pressure began to pile on Ankara to act unilaterally. 
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Table 1: Number of Anadolu Agency (AA) articles issued in 2012 
to 2016 and number of words appeared. 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of Articles 4121 6474 9269 10988 12723 
Number of Articles 
with "Syria" 
1002 1386 1323 1790 2708 
Number of Articles 
with "Safe Zone" 
8 1 25 40 49 
Number of Articles 
with "Buffer Zone" 
16 13 38 30 17 
Number of Articles 
with "No-fly Zone" 
13 10 44 26 32 
Number of Articles 
with "Safe Haven" 
4 5 55 25 29 
Word count of 
"Syria" 
1496 2020 6225 7978 12987 
Word count of "Safe 
Zone" & "Syria" 
16 0 49 83 124 
Word count of 
"Buffer Zone" & 
"Syria" 
33 10 64 15 10 
Word count of "No-
fly Zone" & "Syria" 
15 24 72 40 46 
Word count of "Safe 
Haven" & "Syria" 
5 3 71 8 20 
  
 
2013-2014: Internationalism, refugees and the Kurdish 
question 
 
Refugees swamped Turkey in early 2013. They not only affected 
southeastern Turkey and the region contiguous to Syria’s borders but also 
tipped the demographic balance in Turkey’s cities.38 There were additional 
refugees’ camps on the Syrian side of Turkey’s border because Turkey felt 
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it could no longer absorb refugees and efforts were made to keep at least 
some in Syria. The Turkish Red Crescent and other NGOs attempted to 
offer these refugees–housed in over 70 makeshift camps strung along the 
border–some succor, but access to the camps was dependent on the 
shifting positions and fortunes of rebel groups and Syrian government 
forces.39 Substantive assistance from governments or the UN was in short 
supply–largely on account of the collective action crisis mentioned above. 
There was little way for Turkey, as a sovereign state, to ensure even a 
modicum of access to humanitarian relief and shelter in Turkey let alone 
safety, for the refugees in Syria. After all, Syria remained a sovereign state 
with all the rights and obligations inherent to such states under 
international law.   
 
Table 2: Cosine similarity and normalization figures from 2012 
to 2016 
 
 Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2012 
  Safe zone Buffer zone No-fly zone 
Syria 0.16 0.27 0.18 
Safe zone   0.67 0.59 
Buffer zone     0.73 
    
 Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2013 
  Safe zone Buffer zone No-fly zone 
Syria none 0.14 0.06 
Safe zone   none none 
Buffer zone     0.02 
    
 Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2014 
  Safe zone Buffer zone No-fly zone 
Syria 0.48 0.20 0.43 
Safe zone   0.73 0.95 
Buffer zone     0.75 
    
 Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2015 
  Safe zone Buffer zone No-fly zone 
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Syria 0.35 0.20 0.31 
Safe zone   0.70 0.76 
Buffer zone     0.56 
    
 Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2016 
  Safe zone Buffer zone No-fly zone 
Syria 0.14 0.07 0.25 
Safe zone   0.33 0.64 
Buffer zone     0.28 
 
Throughout 2013 and into 2014, Turkey continued to request UN support 
and/or US or NATO support to establish safe zones.40 Ankara felt it 
required international legitimacy and consensus in order to cross the 
Syrian border and establish such a zone. However, US officials fended off 
Turkish requests because they would entail no-fly zones and a wider 
American military commitment.41 This appeared to change when chemical 
weapons were used in attacks in August 2013 and the US appeared to 
reassess its largely non-interventionist stance in Syria. Deft diplomacy by 
Moscow in the form of agreeing to monitor the destruction of Assad’s 
chemical weapons cache, however, quickly defused the crisis and allowed 
the US to avoid any military action in Syria.42 It also demonstrated to the 
Russians and others just how deeply reticent the US was to get involved in 
Syria.43 
 
In October 2014, as Turkey attempted to address the volatile situation AA 
published a map showing Ankara’s proposed safe zones.44 The zone would 
stretch from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Akçakale border 
crossing, encompassing land on both sides of the Euphrates.45 Turkey then 
publicized its willingness to send ground troops into Syria to establish the 
safe zone, potentially with US air support.46 However, the zone’s 
establishment became more complicated when the Obama administration 
decided to support Kurdish fighters of the People’s Protection Units 
(YPG), the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the 
Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Branded as a 
terrorist group by Turkey, the US, the EU, and other states, Turkey has 
considered the PKK an existential threat and has combatted a PKK-led 
insurgency since 1984. 
 
Turkey confronted US support for the YPG with disbelief and outright 
anger. Turkey had attempted to gain US support for various interventions 
in Syria since 2012 to no avail. When the US did decide to intervene, it did 
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so by using the one group fighting in Syria that Ankara viewed as 
potentially the most dangerous to Turkey. Turkey felt betrayed by its ally. 
 
Cosine similarity and normalization figures and analysis 
 
Cosine similarity results based on figures from AA’s 2013 English-
language articles mentioning the various terminologies were inconclusive. 
That is, cosine similarity was either extremely low as in the case of Syria 
and buffer zones [0.14] or non-existent. This changed in 2014 when AA 
articles on safe zones and no-fly zones demonstrated a much greater 
degree of cosine similarity [0.95], followed by buffer zones and no-fly 
zones [0.75], which were followed by buffer zones and safe zones [0.73]. 
With the benefit of hindsight as well as the cosine figures, we therefore 
posit that Turkish policy makers showed equal interest in no-fly zone/safe 
zones, as well as the possible establishment of a combination of 
safe/buffer/no-fly zones because this was what was politically feasible in 
Turkey at the time. 
 
Related cosine similarity findings reflected Turkey’s contradictory policy 
signals vis-à-vis Syria in 2014. These demonstrated a shift in trajectory 
from a foreign policy that was largely unilateral in 2012 and therefore 
focused on the establishment of buffer zones to secure the border, stem 
refugee flows and guarantee Syria’s territorial integrity. Yet by 2014, 
Ankara was clearly emphasizing multilateral partner solutions and safe 
zones. Turkey did this in order to convince international partners to 
participate in efforts to assist refugees and rebel forces, downgrade the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and remove Assad. 
Additionally, it did so in order to de-emphasize any perceived unilateral 
aims of Turkey.47 To put it colloquially, Ankara and therefore the AA 
articles that provided explanations and announcements of government 
policy, were throwing terms at the proverbial wall in an effort to see what 
would stick. For example, then-prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu insisted, 
“We have never used the term buffer zone. We have used the term safe 
haven.”48 However, Numan Kurtulmus, the Deputy Prime Minister 
contradicted Davutoğlu, noting, “We [Turkey] want a no-fly zone and a 
buffer zone [in Syria].”49 This semantic confusion, by no means confined 
to Turkey alone,50 is further reflected in cosine similarity results for 2014 
where the cosine similarity for all terms is consistently high–an indication 
that Turkey’s leaders were themselves confused by the terms and unsure 
as to which policies to pursue given the uncertainty of action by the US, 
the UN and others. 
 
In hindsight, Turkey’s rhetorical change mattered little. Turkey’s calls for 
safe zones or safe havens were met with grudging support or downright 
rejection. The US still considered Syria a low priority while Iran and the 
Syrian regime warned against the move. Russia also signaled its 
opposition to the plan, particularly as it filled the power vacuum left by the 
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absence US forces in the region.51 Moscow and Damascus realized they 
had much-increased military and political opportunity spaces in which to 
operate, though Russia remained a largely invisible actor throughout 2014. 
However, Assad and his main ally, Iran, attempted to turn the tide against 
various rebel forces. This resulted in some hard-won gains that by the 
close of 2014 resulted in a fluid stalemate characterized by fluctuating 
battle lines but no clear momentum. This changed rapidly in 2015 Syrian 
government forces suffered a series of military setbacks.  
 
2015-2016: Russia’s Entry into Syria and Turkey’s Calculations 
 
In July 2015, Assad made a formal request to Russia for military 
assistance, to include air strikes. Russia duly complied sending warplanes, 
tanks, and combat troops. Ships of the Black Sea Fleet were there by 
September.52  
 
As Ankara touted the establishment of safe zones in concert with some 
type of no-fly zone in public, in private it again mulled the establishment 
of buffer zones through unilateral military incursions.53 Erdoğan favored 
this strategy given recent advances by YPG fighters, but Turkey’s military 
was less sanguine.54 Turkey now counted both Iran and Russia as its 
southern neighbors in Syria, further complicating an already difficult 
position. Suspicious of Russia’s motives, Turkey took a strongly defensive 
position against Russian actions in Syria. Things came to a head in 
November 2015 when Turkey downed a Russian aircraft. Russian anger 
over the downing of its jet and the subsequent murder of its pilot boiled 
over as protesters burned Turkish flags and broke windows at the Turkish 
Embassy in Moscow. President Vladimir Putin immediately issued a 
restrictive visa regime and a blanket travel ban on Turkey and a battery of 
economic sanctions. 
 
Turkey’s economy, already pummeled by a strong dollar, loss of significant 
trade with Syria and hosting millions of Syrian refugees sustained a 
further blow when Russian tourists and businesspeople vanished. 
Additionally, Turkey had become the target of deadly terrorist attacks by 
ISIL beginning in mid-2015. Not only had the Russians departed, but 
other visitors also avoided Turkey. When an attempted coup d’état sought 
to remove Erdoğan from power in July 2016, it shook the Turkish Republic 
to its foundations. Turks were not only shocked by the coup attempt, with 
many believing that coups d’état were longer possible in Turkey,55 but fed 
up with Ankara’s inability to stem the flow of refugees and limit the 
violence in Syria.56 As Ankara attempted to recover and formulate a 
response, international reactions to the attempted coup largely informed 
Turkey’s new stance vis-à-vis Syria. Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım 
officially announced Ankara’s new Syria policy in late August 2016. 
Importantly, it included working with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United 
States, and Russia as well as Syria’s Assad for a settlement to the crisis.57 
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In the charged post-coup atmosphere, Ankara realized its Syria policy of 
supporting opposition militias against Assad underestimated his staying 
power and had “…overlooked the fact that [Assad] had over the years 
gained a status over and above ethnic and sectarian divisions.”58 Ankara’s 
newfound willingness to work with Russia was also driven by pragmatism 
and Moscow’s condemnation of the attempted coup.59 Turkey also realized 
Iran, which had also condemned the coup, was a difficult partner, but one 
that shared Turkey’s interest in stopping the establishment of a Kurdish 
state.60 In contrast, NATO allies were slow to condemn the coup and sent 
mixed signals to Ankara.61 
 
As relations with Russia improved, Turkey quickly sought Russian support 
for a safe zone stretching approximately 40 km into Syria that would act as 
a buffer between two Kurdish-held areas to the east and west and against 
ISIL to the south. Though relations between Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran 
had improved, Ankara remained formally opposed to President Bashar al-
Assad staying in power and was unhappy about Russian operations against 
anti-Assad fighters as well as Iran’s efforts to bolster the regime. 
 
Cosine similarity and normalization figures and analysis 
 
Regardless of the political and strategic differences on the ground, Turkey 
and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran appeared to work quickly in the 
latter half of 2016 to institute safe zones policed by no-fly zones. Our 
cosine similarity calculations from 2015 support this as a consensus 
formed in Ankara that safe zones bolstered by no-fly zones should form 
one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s Syria policy. Cosine similarity results 
from 2015 (Table 2) appear to demonstrate almost equal support in 
Ankara for a combination of safe zones and no-fly zones [0.76]. A 
combination of safe zones and buffer zones [0.70] closely followed. A 
combination of buffer zones and no-fly zones [0.56] came last. In essence, 
cosine similarity results in 2015 arguably point to a “gelling” of views in 
Ankara that distances 2015 from the confusion of the previous three years 
and marks a turning point in Turkey’s Syria policy options and strategic 
choices. 
 
By 2016, cosine similarity was again highest in relation to safe zones 
policed by a no-fly zone [0.64], but that number dropped from a high in 
2014 of [0.95]. Similarly, in 2016, cosine similarity figures indicate a 
further hardening of Ankara’s stance vis-à-vis pushing for a combination 
of safe zones [0.33] and no-fly zones [0.28]. The cosine similarity 
calculations also adequately reflected Ankara’s acceptance of realities on 
the ground and its rapprochement with Russia that continued into 2017. 
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Conclusion 
 
Syria’s ongoing civil war has been a source acute instability in Turkey. 
Turkish foreign policy in relation to the crisis has appeared to be largely 
reactive in nature, as Ankara has shifted policy and state action to address 
the changing situation on the ground and as the number of foreign states 
acting in Syria steadily increased in the years 2011-2016. This research is 
an attempt to shed light on what best accounts for Ankara’s changeable 
policy towards various foreign policy options such as buffer zones and no-
fly zones by utilizing methodologies such as text mining and related cosine 
similarity measures of reporting by the Anadolu Agency (AA), a Turkish 
state-owned press. Applying these methodologies in concert with content 
analysis and qualitative analysis, we have demonstrated that Turkey’s 
seemingly inexplicable policy shifts at times adhered to a logic and, in 
some cases, could have been anticipated. Utilizing such methodologies 
therefore offers a potentially significant contribution to the literature by 
defining politically feasible outcomes related to foreign or domestic 
policies. The accompanying time-series analysis conducted has shown 
numerically and vividly how the use of keywords by the Government of 
Turkey has changed over time. While these findings are valid, reliable, and 
generalizable, a note of caution is required. The number of articles for a 
particular keyword can represent on a fraction of articles issued in a year. 
Similarly, the number of particular keywords (for example, Buffer Zone) 
may not be large enough for robust calculation of cosine similarity. 
Numerically assessing the “risk” of applying text mining with the small 
number of words targeted is impossible because a method for doing so 
does not exist. In short, further testing should be performed using these 
same methodologies and these should never stand on alone but rather 
support time-series analyses as well as primary and secondary sources. In 
the case of this article, our attempt has further demonstrated that the use 
of text mining in a supporting role with robust qualitative analysis of state-
run media sources can yield valuable results and insights in the field of 
foreign policy analysis and security studies.  
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